# GSOE9210 Engineering Decisions 

Victor Jauregui<br>vicj@cse.unsw.edu.au<br>www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~gs9210

## Updating belief

(1) Bayesian updating

- Airline case study
(2) Value of information
- Actions which affect epistemic state
(3) Sensitivity analysis


## Outline

(1) Bayesian updating

- Airline case study


## Case study: capital purchase



## Example (Unit purchase)

You're the chief engineer of a small commercial airline which, due to increased demand for its services, is considering buying (B) a used airliner. Another company is offering to sell one of its airliners for $\$ 400,000$. The actual value of a used airliner depends on its reliability, assessment of which would require a detailed inspection.

Question: should you purchase?

## Modelling

- Simplification 1: categorise used airliners as either: very reliable $(v R)$, moderately reliable $(m R)$, or unreliable $(u R)$.
- Given: industry airliner reliability records

| Reliability |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $v R$ | $m R$ | $u R$ |
| Probability | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| Utility | 1.0 | 0.34 | 0.01 |

- Simplification 2: use $\$ M$ as utiles; actual utility should combine management's preferences about risk, financial position (e.g., liquidity), customer sentiment, lost revenues, etc.
- Given: utility of not buying airliner-status quo: 0.17


## Decision C (buy or not)



$$
\begin{aligned}
& U(\mathrm{~B})=0.2(1.0)+0.3(0.34)+0.5(0.01)=0.31 \\
& U(\overline{\mathrm{~B}})=0.17
\end{aligned}
$$

|  | $(0.2)$ | $(0.3)$ | $(0.5)$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $v R$ | $m R$ | $u R$ |  |
| B | 1.00 | 0.34 | 0.01 |  |
| $\overline{\mathrm{~B}}$ | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 |  |

## Decision C

- Maximal utility principle: choose alternative with maximal expected utility
- Evaluate decision points/nodes by the maximal utility of its alternatives (i.e., actions/strategies)
- The value of decision node is 0.31 , because $0.31>0.17$; i.e., $0.31=\max \{0.17,0.31\}$



## Outline

(2) Value of information

- Actions which affect epistemic state


## Get more information?

## Example (Additional information)

You have the option to consult an aeronautical engineering firm to conduct an assessment of the airliner for $\$ 10,000$. The firm's report will be either favourable $(f)$ or unfavourable $(u)$.

Firm's assessment reliable?
Guess/estimate that $90 \%$ of very reliable planes receive favourable assessment; i.e., $P(f \mid v R)=0.9$

|  | conditional on: |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Probability of: | $v R$ | $m R$ | $u R$ |
| $f$ | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.1 |
| $u$ | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.9 |

## Value of information

## Bayesian revision of probabilities

- Now:

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(v R \mid f) & =\frac{P(f \mid v R) P(v R)}{P(f \mid v R) P(v R)+P(f \mid m R) P(m R)+P(f \mid u R) P(u R)} \\
& =\frac{0.9(0.2)}{0.9(0.2)+0.6(0.3)+0.1(0.5)} \\
& =\frac{0.18}{0.41} \approx 0.44
\end{aligned}
$$

- Similarly:

$$
P(m R \mid f) \approx 0.44 \quad P(u R \mid f) \approx 0.12
$$

- For an unfavourable report:

$$
\begin{aligned}
P(v R \mid u) & =\frac{0.02}{0.59} \approx 0.04 \\
P(m R \mid u) & \approx 0.20 \\
P(u R \mid u) & \approx 0.76
\end{aligned}
$$

## Utility adjustments

- Question: How does the report's cost $(\$ 10,000)$ affect utility?
- Observation: report cost is small relative to other monetary quantities involved: the cost of the purchase is $\$ 400,000$; i.e., $\$ 10,000 \ll \$ 400,000$
- Simplification 3: model effect by constant shift; i.e., for report costing $\$ x(x \ll 400,000)$, the change of utility is $\Delta u=\frac{x}{1,000,000}$; i.e., evaluate a reliable airliner at $\$ 1 M$
- That is, every $\$ 10 K$ is worth 0.01 utiles


## Decision A (report favourable)



- The revised expected utility of buying the airliner is $U(\mathrm{~B})=0.44(0.99)+0.44(0.33)+0.12(0.0)=0.58$
- The utility of not buying it is $U(\overline{\mathrm{~B}})=0.16$.

|  | $(0.44)$ | $(0.44)$ | $(0.12)$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $v R$ | $m R$ | $u R$ |  |
| B | 0.99 | 0.33 | 0.0 |  |
| $\overline{\mathrm{~B}}$ | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 |  |

## Decision B (report unfavourable)



- The revised expected utility of buying the airliner is

$$
U(\mathrm{~B})=0.04(0.99)+0.20(0.33)+0.76(0.0)=0.10
$$

- The utility of not buying it is $U(\overline{\mathrm{~B}})=0.16$.

|  | $(0.04)$ | $(0.20)$ | $(0.76)$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $v R$ | $m R$ | $u R$ |  |
| B | 0.99 | 0.33 | 0.0 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| B | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.16 |  |

## Combined decision

- Combine all three possible cases into one big decision problem
- Introduce new decision: commission survey (report), and no survey
- Introduce new event: report outcome ( $f$ or $u$ )
- If consultant good, report likely to be good predictor of (i.e., correlated to) aircraft reliability
- Consultant's increased predictive accuracy is valuable in making decision



## Combined decision

- From the denominators in the earlier calculations:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P(f)=0.41 \\
& P(u)=0.59
\end{aligned}
$$

- Therefore if the report is commissioned we have the equivalent lottery:

- The U of this lottery is 0.33



## Decision table

|  | $f, v R$ | $f, m R$ | $f, u R$ | $u, v R$ | $u, m R$ | $u, u R$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $A_{1}$ | 1.0 | 0.34 | 0.01 | 1.0 | 0.34 | 0.01 |  |
| $A_{2}$ | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.17 |  |
| $A_{3}$ | 0.99 | 0.33 | 0 | 0.99 | 0.33 | 0 |  |
| $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ | $\vdots$ |  | $\ldots$ |  |  |  |
| $A_{6}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

where
$A_{1}$ no survey; buy airliner
$A_{2}$ no survey; don't buy airliner
$A_{3}$ commission survey; buy airliner
$A_{4}$ commission survey; don't buy
$A_{5}$ commission survey; if favourable, buy airliner; else don't buy
$A_{6} \quad$ commission survey; if favourable, don't buy airliner; else buy

## Value of information

- So the optimal policy if the report is commissioned is:


## Policy C: report commissioned

If the report is favourable buy airliner, if not don't buy it.

- The value of this policy is $U(\mathrm{C})=0.33$, inclusive of the 0.01 fee
- The optimal policy if the report not commissioned is:

Policy $\overline{\mathrm{C}}$ : report not commissioned
Buy the airliner.

- $U(\overline{\mathrm{C}})=0.31$
- How much is the report worth to you?
- $U(\mathrm{C})=0.34-u_{r} \geqslant 0.31=U(\overline{\mathrm{C}})$; i.e., you should commission the report for a value/price up to $u_{r}=0.03$; i.e., $x \sim \$ 30,000$


## Outline

(3) Sensitivity analysis

## Production and demand

## Example (Production)

Alice is the CTO at a company and Bob is the CFO. They are discussing two possible production processes for one of its products. Measured in $\$ \mathrm{~K} /$ year, process A is expected to net $\$ 40$ if demand increases, $\$ 30$ if demand remains stable, and $\$ 20$ if demand falls. Process B requires a greater initial capital expenditure; it will only net $\$ 10$ if demand drops, and $\$ 40$ otherwise.
Future estimates of demand are: $20 \%$ of increasing, $30 \%$ chance of staying level, and $50 \%$ of decreasing.

Which process should Alice implement?

## Sensitivity analysis

## Example

The decision table is:

$$
\begin{array}{rlcc} 
& \begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{5}{10} & \frac{3}{10} & \frac{2}{10} \\
\downarrow & - & \uparrow \\
& \downarrow & \\
\hline \mathrm{A} & \$ 20 & \$ 30
\end{array} \$ 40 & \begin{array}{l}
\$ 27 \\
\mathrm{~B}
\end{array} & \$ 10
\end{array} \$ 40 \quad \$ 40 \quad \$ 25
$$

A has greater expected monetary value

## Example

Alice consults Bob who advises her that, under its current financial position, the company's preferences are:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \$ 20 \sim\left[\frac{3}{5}: \$ 40 \left\lvert\, \frac{2}{5}\right.: \$ 10\right] \\
& \$ 30 \sim\left[\frac{4}{5}: \$ 40 \left\lvert\, \frac{1}{5}\right.: \$ 10\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

The company's utility for money is:

The utility table:


$$
\begin{aligned}
U(\mathrm{~A}) & =\frac{5}{10}\left(\frac{3}{5}\right)+\frac{3}{10}\left(\frac{4}{5}\right)+\frac{2}{10}(1) \\
& =\frac{1}{50}(15+12+10)=\frac{74}{100} \\
U(\mathrm{~B}) & =\frac{5}{10}(0)+\frac{3}{10}(1)+\frac{2}{10}(1) \\
& =\frac{1}{50}(0+15+10)=\frac{50}{100}
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore A will have greater utility.

## Sensitivity analysis

Suppose Bob cannot give precise assessments on the values of $\$ 20$ and $\$ 30$, only bounds:

$$
\begin{aligned}
{\left[\frac{3}{5} \$ 40\right] } & \succ \$ 20 \succ\left[\frac{1}{2} \$ 40\right] \\
\$ 40 & \succ \$ 30 \succ\left[\frac{4}{5} \$ 40\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

The company's utility for money is:


## Sensitivity analysis



Bounds on A :

$$
\begin{aligned}
U(\mathrm{~A}) & >\frac{5}{10}\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)+\frac{3}{10}\left(\frac{4}{5}\right)+\frac{2}{10}(1) \\
& =\frac{1}{100}(25+24+20) \\
& =\frac{69}{100} \\
U(\mathrm{~A}) & <\frac{5}{10}\left(\frac{3}{5}\right)+\frac{3}{10}(1)+\frac{2}{10}(1) \\
& =\frac{1}{100}(30+30+20) \\
& =\frac{80}{100}
\end{aligned}
$$

That is:

$$
\frac{69}{100}<U(\mathrm{~A})<\frac{80}{100}
$$

Conclusion:
A is guaranteed to be preferred to $\mathrm{B}\left(U(\mathrm{~B})=\frac{50}{100}\right)$ regardless of the uncertainty over the precise preference for $\$ 20$ and $\$ 30$.

## Sensitivity analysis

## Summary

- Explored decision problems in greater depth:
- Actions that affect epistemic state (value of information-gathering actions)
- dealing with uncertainty in preferences (sensitivity analysis)
- Updating beliefs (epistemic state) via Bayes's rule
- Value of information: cost of gathering more information versus increase in expected utility due to new information
- Sensitivity analysis:
- decisions under imprecise preferences
- does preference uncertainty affect a decision?

